SCOTT SHANE ESSAY - WASHINGTON


THE MOVIES MAKE it look so easy: the sniper’s crosshairs on a terrorist’s forehead; the plastic explosive taped beneath a foreign spy’s car; the lethal potion slipped into a dictator’s morning coffee.

So perhaps the biggest surprise about the Central Intelligence Agency’s furor du jour - the secret program, hidden from Congress, to kill the leaders of Al Qaeda - is not that there was such a program, which many Americans assumed.

Nor is it that former Vice President Dick Cheney instructed the C.I.A. to keep the program from Congress. Mr. Cheney has never been accused of reckless openness about intelligence programs.

The real surprise is that in eight years of offagain, on-again brainstorming, planning and training, the program did not kill a single terrorist. It did not even mount an attempt, C.I.A. officials say.

Killing a specific terrorist in a faraway country, using the up-close-and-personal methods that the secret program was created to explore, turns out to be considerably more complicated than the cinematic fantasy.

Dropping missiles from unmanned aircraft has proven logistically and politically so much simpler that the alternatives have never been tried, intelligence officers say. Al Qaeda has obliged by hiding out not in cities but in the rugged mountains of Pakistan, where missile attacks are feasible.

Hence President Obama has not only continued the drone strikes begun under President George W. Bush, but even stepped them up. Despite the collateral killings of terrorist suspects’ families and neighbors, and the political backlash such missile strikes produce, the drones keep American intelligence officers thousands of kilometers from the deaths, which clearly has made this approach attractive to both administrations.

Few operations are riskier than a targeted killing, but the idea of eliminating a very bad guy has an alluring simplicity.

Yet the reasons the C.I.A. might have hesitated.

before dispatching a team of killers are easily imagined by anyone who has followed the gyrations of the agency’s history. In recent decades, the C.I.A. has been pressured often by a president to take risky actions, only to face investigations and condemnation when the actions are exposed.

The C.I.A.’s biggest worries as it contemplated ordering an attack on a terrorist overseas may not have been about the law, said William C. Banks, a law professor at Syracuse University in New York State who has studied targeted killings.

At least by American government calculations, the killing of a Qaeda member is an act of war, not assassination. The ban on assassination, in effect since President Gerald Ford’s executive order of 1976, would apply only to “politically inspired killings of people who are not combatants,” Mr. Banks said. To be a lawful target, a terrorist must be “engaged in armed combat with the United States,” he said. “Bin Laden is the poster child, and you work your way down the Al Qaeda ladder from there.”

Killing such a target would arguably be permissible, Mr. Banks said, if he were in hostile territory where capture was infeasible. But if the target were in Paris, the law of war obligates the United States to work with French authorities to seize the suspect.

The logistical difficulty and political risk of picking off a terrorist away from a war zone are daunting.

When the C.I.A. seized a radical Muslim cleric in Milan in 2003 and flew him to Egypt, Italian authorities tracked the whole operation through cellphone calls and hotel receipts, leading to a criminal trial for 26 Americans in absentia that is still going on. Another rendition team picked up a Lebanese-born German citizen in Macedonia and took him to Afghanistan - setting off an international fiasco for the United States when it turned out the C.I.A. had grabbed the wrong Khalid el- Masri.

Such a record of tradecraft would not exactly encourage C.I.A. bosses to give the “go” order to a killing team. And in any case, anyone familiar with the agency’s history would already have ample reason for caution.

Assassination is a word that still haunts the C.I.A. The most lurid of the volumes produced by the Senate committee headed by Frank Church of Idaho in the mid-1970s detailed the C.I.A.’s plots to kill foreign political figures, including Cuba’s Fidel Castro and the Congo’s Patrice Lumumba. Such intrigues were overseen by the agency’s Health Alteration Committee.

But those schemes were as ineffective as they were scandalous. Mr. Castro, now 82, has outlived most of those who plotted to kill him. Mr. Lumumba was killed by a rival Congolese group after a would-be C.I.A. assassin balked. “People forget this now, but when the Church report came out there was a lot of mockery of the C.I.A. as the gang that couldn’t shoot straight,” said Loch K. Johnson, a former Church committee staff member.

Targeted killings are “very difficult to pull off, and it’s politically toxic if you’re caught,” said Geneve Mantri, who tracks counterterrorism programs at Amnesty International. “This Jason Bourne stuff is great for the movies, but the history is that these cases often end up as a mess.”





The C.I.A. plotted to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, the Congolese leader, but someone else killed him first in 1961.